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Abstract
The paper argues that the so-called canonical view of the Italian industrial district (ID)
depicts it as a system whose economic and social vitality requires the interaction between
two major sub-systems: a community of people and a community of ¯rms. A range of
circumstances - including insu±cient aggregate demand, competition from low-cost coun-
tries and technological change - have determined inconsistencies between the rationales
of these two sub-systems. As a result, lead ¯rms have emerged that substitute the ID as
coordinating instances. In the pursuit of their goals, they tend to prefer cost scrapping
to quality enhancement, thereby determining a competition that further undermines the
ID as a system. The paper contends that this outcome is not the only possible one. An
alternative would require the regulatory - as opposed to merely permissive - action of pub-
lic actors in that it would have to change the incentive system that leads ¯rms to choose
short-sighted strategies. ¤
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The aim of the paper is to discuss the role of Italian industrial districts
(IDs) in the light of present discussions concerning the stagnation, if not
downright decline, of the nation's economy. It argues that these discussions
tend o downplay, among other things, the role that social cohesion actually
plays in the performance of IDs.
The paper argues that the so-called canonical view of the ID depicts it as
a system whose economic and social vitality requires the interaction between
two major sub-systems: a community of people and a community of ¯rms.
A range of circumstances { including insu±cient aggregate demand, compe-
tition from low-cost countries and technological change { have determined
inconsistencies between the rationales of these two sub-systems. As a result,
lead ¯rms have emerged that substitute the ID as coordinating instances. In
the pursuit of their goals, they tend to prefer cost scrapping to quality en-
hancement, thereby determining a competition that further undermines the
ID as a system.
The paper contends that this outcome is not the only possible one. An
alternative would require the regulatory { as opposed to merely permissive {
action of public actors in that it would have to change the incentive system
that leads ¯rms to choose short-sighted strategies.
The paper is arranged as follows. The section that follows brie°y sum-
marises the key issues involved in discussions concerning Italy's dismal eco-
nomic performance. This concise introduction provides a terms of reference
to better situate IDs within the overall performance of the Italian economy
and to appreciate the theoretical peculiarity of the district-based approach.
Section 3 focuses on what allows IDs to be competitive, to achieve economic
growth and to reproduce themselves as a socio-economic system. It contends
that the key issue is that IDs must comply with stringent requirements for
social cohesion: economic activity must interact with the social and cultural
environments in a way that reinforces both, thereby reproducing the district
as a coordinating instance. This does not appear to be the case, however.
Section 4 discusses some data concerning the performance of IDs on economic
and social grounds. It suggests that while the former may have some posi-
tive traits, these are obtained at the expense of the latter, by undermining
social cohesion. The implication is that the conditions for the persistence of
districts may eventually disappear, thereby leading to di®erent types of local
organisation, such as clusters, which, as the subsequent section argues, would
require a de¯nitely more active public policy. Section 5 discusses two alter-
native views of the outlined process. According to the prevailing account,
it is the somewhat natural outcome of the institutional rigidity of districts
1and of their evolution towards a ¯rm-centred local system. The alternative
account that the paper suggests is based on the existence of inconsistencies
between the two subsystems that IDs comprise. The institutions that under-
lie the community of ¯rms lead the latter towards strategies that clash with
the institutions that underlie the community of people. The demise of the ID
is therefore possible; it is not necessary, however. In order to overcome this
inconsistency public policies are required that go beyond the merely ancillary
role that the district-based view tends to assign to public action.
2 Industrial districts and recent trends in the
Italian economy
A fairly large amount of Italy's economic literature has recently focused on
the country's stagnation. Italy's growth rate has been decreasing over time
and it is lower than in most other industrialised countries (Table 1). Some
authors have explicitly referred to a downright economic decline (Gallino
2003; Toniolo, Visco 2004; Nardozzi, 2004; Rossi, 2006). Based on the claim
that this is a long run phenomenon, many scholars suggest that it must be
regarded as a supply side issue and argue that the main reason for the decline
lies in the slow growth of productivity, which, in their view, is associated to
the structural features of the Italian economy2. Nardozzi (2004: 100) con-
tends that \the slowdown in the productivity of our manufacturing industry
relative to countries, such as France and Germany, [...] is accounted for
by two persistent peculiarities: the \dwarfness" of ¯rms and a productive
specialisation in traditional sectors."3. Following a classi¯cation µ a la Pavitt,
Nardozzi argues that traditional sectors are not technology intensive, so that
their techniques are hardly subject to any upgrading. They are easy to estab-
lish in less developed countries and their competitiveness ultimately depends
on production costs. The small size of ¯rms reinforces the negative conse-
quences of this sectoral bias in two ways. First, precisely because they are
small, ¯rms cannot reap the bene¯ts of scale economies in production. Sec-
ond, independently of production, they do not have the minimum e±cient
scale to carry out R&D or to follow up their productive activity with ap-
propriate marketing strategies. As a result, P. Ciocca (2003: 87*) argues,
Italy is \squeezed" between \new trade partners (...) who are prone to ex-
port consumption goods that Italy produces and to import investment goods
2Although there is reason to believe that such a distinction is not appropriate - in that,
as we shall see further on, the decline in aggregate demand de¯nitely a®ected the supply
side { we will not go into this issue.
3Unless otherwise stated all translations from Italian texts are mine.
2that Italy does not produce [and] economies, such as the United States, that
can supply products { consumption and instrumental goods and services {
characterised by scale economies, R&D, and innovation.". The incapability
of Italian ¯rms to increase their size \far from being forced upon them by
[Italy's] pattern of specialisation, freezes that pattern, restricting investments
abroad and limiting exports" (ibid.).
Nardozzi views the \two persistent peculiarities" as a structural backlog:
\In the Seventies and up to the mid-Eighties the rate of growth of labour
productivity in small ¯rms was greater than in large ¯rms. This was the time
of decentralised production and of the insurgence of districts. Subsequently,
this relation switched and the rise in the productivity of large ¯rms was
almost twice as big as in the small ones. [...] The newly established ¯rms
of that period remain small, however, and their \dwarfness" is re°ected in
productivity" (Nardozzi, 2004: 96).
Considering that districts are formed by small and medium sized ¯rms
and that they tend to specialise in traditional sectors, views such as those
summarised above deny { or, at the very least, downplay - the relevance of
districts for economic growth in Italy today. More speci¯cally, Nardozzi's
remarks raise two issues. The ¯rst one is theoretical in that he argues that
\dwarfness" and specialisation in traditional products are a problem in gen-
eral. The second one is empirical in that he claims that the time when
districts were the most vital element in the economy has passed. Conse-
quently, in order to appreciate the role that IDs have in the evolution of the
Italian economy, we must address both of these levels of inquiry. Let us ¯rst
consider the theoretical issue4. We will discuss the empirical ones in Section
4.
The district-based view stresses that in rich capitalist economies goods
should not be classi¯ed in terms of their natural (e.g. metal) or technical (e.g.
mechanical) characteristics but in terms of the types of customers who are
likely to buy them. The nature of modern markets suggests that consumers
look for tailored goods, so that diversi¯cation and customisation are less the
exception than the rule. Rather than re°ecting a defensive strategy carried
out by those who are unable to compete on the \open" market, niches are
what consumer markets are all about. In this perspective, the distinction
between shoes and clothing may be misleading, a more appropriate distinc-
tion being that between high quality products { e.g. high quality clothes
and shoes, which are likely to be sold in the same shop { and cheap ones.
4I will here focus on what is sometimes called the canonical view of industrial districts
- as it is outlined by authors such as Becattini and Brusco { because I believe that it
reassesses the economist's toolbox in the light of the distinctive features of industrial
districts rather than trying to encompass them in the framework of conventional economics.
3The implication is that, in so far as districts specialise in the former type
of goods, they have little to fear from import penetration by less developed
countries.
Obviously, this is not to say that such a specialisation actually exists.
Whether it does or not, however, depends less on the maturity of the in-
dustries than on the ability of districts to \choose" the appropriate strategy
to deal with foreign competition. In this perspective, the strategy that IDs
actually pursue may be appropriate or not but the standard classi¯cation of
industries { whether those generally used by statistical bureaus or the Pavit-
tian one { is nonetheless misleading, at least when it refers to the types of
products districts deal with.
Another aspect of the district-based view is that ¯rms do not only com-
pete, they also cooperate. Cooperation in production leads to a di®erent
division of labour within ¯rms as well as among them, which a®ects also
what and how they learn and innovate. Similar considerations apply to ac-
tivities such as R&D or marketing: ¯rms can cooperate for these just as
for other activities. Thus, what is relevant for economies of scale is not the
size of the ¯rm as such but either the size of the single activity that a ¯rm
carries out or the size of the set of activities jointly carried out by a group
of ¯rms. The critical distinction is not between large and small ¯rms but
between large and district ¯rms on the one hand and isolated small ¯rms on
the other. Furthermore, within a single industry, it is most likely that if ¯rms
consist in single units of production, the goods that large ¯rms produce di®er
from those that small ¯rms produce. Small ¯rms may produce intermediate
goods for the larger ones or they may simply specialise in products that re-
quire smaller minimal e±cient scales. This argument, along with the ones
discussed above, suggests that di®erences among ¯rms are likely to be even
stronger, making it pointless to compare the productivity of large and small
¯rms. Here, too, just as in the discussion of industries, these considerations
do not imply that cooperation as it is today actually is e®ective in terms of
all of these activities. They do imply that the vitality of districts depends
less on the formal boundaries of ¯rms than on an appropriate district-centred
strategy.
The district-based view does not deny that districts may be facing grievous
problems. What it argues is that the appropriate strategy should take into
account the nature of consumer demand in present developed economies and
the potential underlying cooperation among small and medium sized ¯rms.
It is rather skeptical that structural changes such as those purported by the
critics of the \two persistent peculiarities" can be carried out without dis-
rupting the cultural and social circumstances that underlie the insurgence
and success of IDs.
4Despite the richness of the debate, the above discussions tend to downplay
two issues5. The ¯rst one is the role that large ¯rms are actually playing in
the Italian economy. Whatever long term changes may have made scale
economies less important than in the past, there seems to be a di®erence
in the performance between large ¯rms in Italy and in other countries. On
the one hand this suggests that there is scope for scale economies and that
the vitality of large ¯rms may even feed back on IDs, so that it probably is
inappropriate to consider large ¯rms and IDs as alternative economic setups6.
On the other hand, if Italian large ¯rms can perform better than they actually
do, a crucial issue is why they do not. It is obviously reasonable to claim that
they were mismanaged both at the managerial and at the industrial policy
level (Gallino, 2003; De Cecco, 2004). But such a contention only shifts the
problem: how can we rely on large ¯rms if we cannot rely on the required
managerial and political conditions to hold? Can these conditions be reduced
to (lack of) political will and to (lack of) managerial expertise or are there
historical and institutional implications that beg for a more in depth inquiry?
For instance, could it be that managers and politicians were so busy trying
to bypass the lack of social cohesion and a latent - when not explicit - social
con°ict that they con°ated the dynamic e±ciency of the economy with the
redistribution of real income, thereby forsaking whatever action in favour of
innovation7? Isn't there a risk that, in the absence of proper answers to these
questions, policies centred on the removal of the \two persistent peculiarities"
may aggravate Italy's industrial performance?
The second issue that the above discussions downplay is whether districts
are actually meeting the conditions for their vitality. The peculiar character-
istics of IDs do not allow us to rely on a mere assessment of their economic
performance8. An ID is vital { i.e. it can materially and socially reproduce
itself over time { only if it meets the requirements both of the community
of people and of the population of ¯rms that constitute it9. In order to ade-
5A discussion of some theoretical and methodological issues underlying the above de-
bate is in (Ginzburg 2005).
6Becattini and Dei Ottati (2006:22) partially acknowledge this when they point out
that the relatively good performance of the provinces where both industrial districts and
large ¯rms operate suggests that these two realities may well complement each other.
7Italian governments have been particularly active in reducing welfare expenditure and
in liberalising the labour market while both public and private R&D expenditure { as a
share of GDP - has remained at Europe's lowest levels for quite a long time.
8To be true, this applies to economic activity in general (Sen, 1987) but, for the reasons
that follow, it is especially true for IDs.
9In Becattini's words, an ID is \a socio-territorial entity which is characterised by the
active presence of both a community of people and a population of ¯rms in one naturally
and historically bounded area." (Becattini 1990: 38).
5quately appreciate this contention, the section that follows focuses on social
cohesion. On the one hand social cohesion re°ects the extent to which the
requirements of the community of people in the ID are met. On the other,
it is crucial for the organisation and coordination of production and inno-
vation. So the question is whether it is actually possible to meet these two
requirements.
3 Industrial districts and the centrality of so-
cial cohesion
Social cohesion is a central feature in all discussions of IDs because it is, at
one time, a condition for and a consequence of the vitality of the district10.
The term \social cohesion", however, is somewhat ambiguous. Let us brie°y
consider its characteristics.
Social cohesion often refers to the absence of social con°ict. Persuasion
and bargaining may not provide generally accepted solutions to problems
that relate to industrial relations or to the welfare provisions of central and
local government. The ensuing social con°ict is the cause of great concern, on
strictly economic grounds, because it may lead to social disruption, economic
uncertainty and, ultimately, a decline in economic growth. This notion of
social cohesion applies to practically any type of economic organisation.
The notion of social cohesion I refer to here is more restrictive. It consists
in the involvement of economic actors. It is not enough that they should not
disrupt the economy; they must, at least to some extent, feel that the ends
they pursue match those of the economic organisations they act in11.
In order to achieve the ¯rst type of social cohesion, economic actors need
only acknowledge that social con°ict is ine®ectual: although, in abstract
terms, it might allow them to achieve their goals, in practice power relations
or other circumstances suggest that this would not be the case. In order to
achieve the second type of social cohesion, economic actors must acknowledge
that cooperation is the most appropriate way to achieve their own goals. In
what follows, I will refer to this second type.
10This is, arguably, the distinguishing feature between (Marshallian) industrial districts
and other types of local production systems such as Porter's (1998) \clusters".
11\In order to achieve a capacity for invention and innovation, (...) it is essential that
many people understand the technology with which they work. This, in turn, requires
continual informal interaction in cafµ es and bars and in the street. In this way, new ideas
are formed and transmitted." (Brusco 1990: 16). The informal interaction Brusco refers
to would hardly be possible if all actors were not involved in the general goals of the ¯rms
they work for.
6Social cohesion involves trust. Trust is the belief that other actors will
behave according to some justice criterion, independently of their personal
gain. Justice is viewed, here, in broad terms: it may involve what is deemed
good in absolute terms, e.g. from a religious point of view; it may also
involve what an outside observer would { pragmatically - deem appropriate
for speci¯c transactions, independently of more general considerations.
Trust is important in inter¯rm relations within IDs because it allows
actors to maintain cooperative relations in a competitive context. It is also
important in intra¯rm relations. Mutual trust, here, implies that workers
are willing to do more than is formally required of them because employers
are willing to acknowledge this extra-e®ort12.
Trust reduces the scope for opportunism, thereby leading to governance
and coordination mechanisms that downplay the latter, to the advantage of
other priorities. Rather than forcing economic activity within the straight-
jacket of control, districts can enhance the interaction among workers within
¯rms and among di®erent ¯rms. Rather than protecting their knowledge {
their skills and their capabilities - in order not to lose their bargaining power,
actors can share it. In so far as they do so, they enhance not only the di®u-
sion of existing knowledge: they allow the creation of new knowledge. In this
perspective, Charlie Chaplin's parody of the Taylorist division of labour in
\Modern Times" would re°ect a waste of resources - the actual and potential
skills of the worker { at the expense of the capabilities13 of the ¯rm, as well
as of the district as a whole.
Social cohesion also involves con¯dence14. While trust has to do with
the behaviour of other actors, con¯dence has to do with a system's over-
all performance. From the perspective of entrepreneurs, con¯dence includes
positive expectations in terms of market demand and pro¯t opportunities. It
involves reliance on the district as a bu®er: should a ¯rm su®er a downturn,
it can always rely on what other ¯rms choose not to produce directly but to
subcontract. From the perspective of a worker, it includes a non decreasing
income and the possibility { should she want to { to set up her own busi-
ness. Here too, the district may act as a bu®er: should one's business be
12\Trust and co-operation, so crucial to the successful performance of the district, is
helped by an attitude that seeks competitive success not by aggressive cutting of direct
labour costs but by general organisational competence, standards and productivity. The
maintenance of labour standards, including good wages, improves the performance of
labour and the performance of the district." (Sengenberger, Pyke, 1992: 5; emphasis in
the original).
13Reference is to the notion of capabilities as depicted in the capabilities approach to
the theory of the ¯rm. See Loasby (1994) and Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000).
14Mistri and Solari (2003) and Mistri (2006) provide an extensive discussion of the
relation between trust and con¯dence.
7unsuccessful, one can always return to her previous type of job.
Social cohesion allows an ID to operate di®erently from a large ¯rm, as
well as from an undi®erentiated set of (small) ¯rms. In so far as this speci¯c
organisation and this operational mode provide its ¯rms with a distinctive
competitive advantage, they eventually validate the actors' mutual trust and
their con¯dence in the district15. This reinforcement e®ect, coupled with
shared knowledge, allows the district to act a ¯rm incubator, thus to repro-
duce entrepreneurial capabilities over time (Becattini 2003).
Despite the positive features depicted above, however, a district may be
unable to maintain its competitive advantage. Districts have to adapt to
two types of change: change coming from outside the district, such as, for
instance, the emergence of India and China in the World economy, tech-
nological breakthroughs that a®ect the competitiveness of its products, or
changes in the level of aggregate demand; change within districts, such as
generational changes in expectations.
Adaptation to these changes involves a range of possible actions, which
may re°ect the purposive conduct of some actor or the spontaneous outcome
of a self-organising process. The type of actions that are actually taken re°ect
a (sometimes implicit) choice as to whether it is better: to rely on path
dependent knowledge in the existing industries or to shift to new industries;
to focus on cost scrapping or on qualitative upgrading; to focus on technology
or on design; etc.. Although in practice these alternatives may not be as clear
cut as they are presented here, the issue remains of what the priorities are.
What is important about these actions is that their priorities cannot be
identi¯ed in terms of competitive advantage alone. The systemic nature
of a district consists in the interaction between two sub-systems: its com-
munity of people and its population of ¯rms. The actions must therefore
meet the requirements of both of these sub-systems: while they must al-
low the material reproduction of the district, they must also be consistent
with the reproduction of the district's social environment. First and fore-
most, they must prevent a disruption of social cohesion. Thus, a district
may fail to adapt to change either because it does not achieve the competi-
tive requirements related to the goods it is specialised in or because it does
not maintain the social cohesion that underlies and supports its productive
structure. Such a failure may occur because of self-referential reliance on
past patterns of infra-district interaction, which is likely to prevent district
actors from appreciating the features of economic change and adapting to
them. In other terms, the speci¯c features of social cohesion may preclude
15Furthermore, both entrepreneurs and workers are likely to take into account the gen-
eral quality of life associated to working in a cooperative environment.
8competitive adaptation. The obverse is also possible, however. The strategy
that pursues competitive adaptation, involving a combination of the choices
outlined above, may eventually undermine social cohesion. The discussion
that follows aims to focus on how these intertwined constraints have a®ected
the vitality of IDs and, possibly, Italy's overall economic performance.
4 Recent trends in economic performance and
social costs
In a recent paper, G. Becattini and G. Dei Ottati (2006) provide a sta-
tistical analysis of the Italian economy during the Nineties. They divide
the manufacturing sectors into four groups: heavy manufacturing industries,
agricultural goods and tobacco, light manufacturing industries, and goods
for individuals and households. The third and fourth groups typically are
those that IDs are specialised in. Becattini and Dei Ottati also divide Italian
provinces into four classes, according to their prevailing industrial structure:
large ¯rm, ID, residual and mixed16. The main conclusion they draw - based
on data from the 1991, 1996 and 2001 censuses - is that IDs generally out-
perform other territories and other manufacturing sectors both in strictly
economic terms and in terms of quality of life. Let us brie°y summarise their
results.
The two district-related groups account for a high share of Italian exports
(62% in 2001) and a positive trade balance, whereas the other two groups
have a negative balance, which, in the case of heavy manufacturing industries,
tends to worsen over time. Similarly, district-related provinces export more
than large ¯rm ones, both in absolute and per capita terms. Value added
rises more in the district-related provinces than elsewhere.
Employment in the private sector rises more in district-related provinces.
It rises especially in non-trade service sectors, mostly in business-related
services. Employment in manufacturing drops everywhere but less in district-
related provinces and in district-related sectors. In the heavy manufacturing
industries, the drop in employment is paralleled by a rise in local units,
thereby leading to a signi¯cant decline in the average size of local units.
Activity ratios are higher and unemployment is lower in district related
provinces. In general, per capita income is higher in these same provinces.
Migration tends to °ow in district-related provinces and out of large ¯rm
16A prevailing structure of a province is \large ¯rm" (\district") if the share of employees
in large ¯rms (districts) exceeds the national share of those same employees. A \mixed"
province is both \large ¯rm" and \district". A residual is neither one.
9and residual provinces. This ¯nal information is particularly important, ac-
cording to Becattini and Dei Ottati. They argue that: \it is unlikely that
people move from areas where they live better and have better job opportu-
nities (according to the conventional wisdom these are the areas with large
¯rms) towards areas that are less advanced in social terms and where em-
ployment ultimately ought to be more precarious (according to the conven-
tional wisdom, these are the areas where small ¯rms prevail, as is the case
of district-related provinces). Obviously, something must be wrong with the
`conventional wisdom"' (Becattini, Dei Ottati 2006: 20).
This remark on the quality of life in IDs not only contends that people
live better in the existing districts but it also reasserts the role of social
cohesion as a distinctive feature of the vitality of IDs. \The data on well
being [...] show that on average it is higher in the district-related provinces.
We care to stress that, according to the theory of the ID, this is not only
the outcome of what we pointed out above but, since it is a factor of social
cohesion, it is also a cause of the higher labour productivity in IDs (in the
goods they specialise in), relative to its accumulation-related (more per capita
instrumental goods) and technology-related (better instrumental goods and
better ¯rm based organisation) determinants." (ibid.: 20-21).
Despite this positive performance, a few problems stand out and should
not be disregarded. Becattini and Dei Ottati distinguish two district-related
groups of industries but, although they do point out that these groups per-
form di®erently, they do not elaborate on these di®erent performances, which
substantially lead to a recomposition: the light manufacturing industries (M)
tend to become more important as the goods for individuals and households
(H) decline. Employment in the latter group drops by {15,3% from 1991
to 2001 while it rises by 7,3% in M. Local units in H drop by 13,4% and
rise by the same percentage in M. This recomposition does not lead to any
signi¯cant (positive) change in the foreign accounts: judging by the trade
balances provided by Becattini and Dei Ottati, the net exports of the rising
group of industries (M) declined after 1996 and never recovered completely,
while the net exports of the declining industries (H) basically kept on rising.
Unfortunately, compensation between the two groups of industries has
not been complete: during the Nineties, employment in M rose by only 46%
(119857 units) of the corresponding drop in H (281576 units). Since these
two groups of industries are generally based in di®erent provinces, the e®ects
on employment have been rather grievous: in some of the district-related
provinces, jobs dropped by 6-8 percentage points from 1995 to 2002. The
impression is that this recomposition led to signi¯cant social costs17. Can
17The notion of social cost used here is the one discussed by K.W. Kapp in his work,
10it be possible that they did not a®ect social cohesion? Given the above
discussed centrality of social cohesion for IDs, this seems to be a rather
important issue.
The share of non regular employees in total employment complements
the above data (Figure 1). The ¯gure for H is always more that twice as
big as the ¯gure for M, while the heavy mechanical industries are somewhere
in between. This suggests that H is characterised by relatively precarious
employment conditions: non regular employees can be sacked whenever their
employer chooses; they are therefore forced { as opposed to willing - to
comply with what s/he deems appropriate; ¯nally, they get no (otherwise
compulsory) social security contributions. Truly, when market demand is
high and growing, the cost of precariousness may be low, as Brusco (1982)
argued, but the above data on employment suggest that this is not the case
today. In these industries, ¯rms are shifting their private costs onto workers,
thereby bypassing competition through the creation of social costs.
The strong di®erence between these two groups of district-related indus-
tries calls for further inquiry. An account for the di®erent performance could
be that H is less subject to technological progress, thus more easily repro-
ducible in low-cost countries. But this would imply that social cohesion in
the related districts either does not exist or it cannot make up for the tech-
nological drawbacks. The data that follows focuses on social cohesion. It
does not allow for a comparison between the two groups of industries but the
aggregate picture is worth taking into account.
Figure 2 provides data on deadly accidents occurring to workers in Italian
provinces, classi¯ed according to the criteria followed by Becattini and Dei
Ottati18. The data shows that working conditions are more dangerous in
district-related provinces than in large ¯rm-related ones. Truly, districts-
related provinces are not the most dangerous areas and the ¯rms involved
may be external to the districts but it is nonetheless striking that this kind
of precariousness should occur where social cohesion is so important19.
especially in Kapp (1978). See also Elsner, Frigato, Ramazzotti (2006) and Berger, Elsner
(2007).
18Deadly accidents are more di±cult to conceal, so data on deaths is more reliable than
data on professional injuries and deseases. It is nonetheless plausible that if ¯rms are not
willing to prevent deadly accidents, they are just as unwilling to prevent other types of
damage. The data in ¯gure 2, therefore, is the sad proxy of what is likely to be a more
extended phenomenon.
19Actually, one might argue that accidents are more likely in IDs precisely because
social cohesion is so strong: workers may feel so involved that they are willing to take a
risk in order to achieve the ¯rm's goals. This could be true but, much like for irregular
employment, it makes sense when achievement of the ¯rm's goals a®ects workers as well.
Social cohesion { in the strong sense outlined above { is unlikely if workers take the risk
11The data considered here has to do with the situation any worker may be
in, as a worker. Let us now consider a situation a worker may look forward
to, that of setting up his/her own business. Indeed, one might be willing to
su®er the social costs depicted above provided they are the price to pay in
order to achieve social mobility. Figure 3 shows that, in the period 1995-2005
more ¯rms were shut down than were set up. Setting up one's own business
became ever more di±cult. Nor is the turnover of ¯rms such that it provides
some opportunity: ¯gure 4 shows that inceptions as such are declining.
A ¯nal feature of IDs that deserves some attention is the emergence of
formal and informal groups of ¯rms within districts. Carone and Iacobucci
(1999: 347) conclude their inquiry on Italian SME groups by stressing \the
progressive `hierarchisation' of inter-¯rm relations and the consequently in-
creasing importance of medium-sized ¯rms that have focused their competi-
tive strategies on two circumstances: a progressive shift towards high quality
market segments (better quality of the product); the control of the ¯nal mar-
ket (through brand-centred strategies and control of distribution).". This is
somewhat consistent with the account that Dei Ottati (1996a) provides of
the Prato district20. However, while at the time of her essay, Dei Ottati
argued that, despite these changes, the Prato district remained \more a bi-
lateral or multilateral governance structure than a hierarchical or uni¯ed one"
(ibid.: 48), Arrighetti and Traµ u (2006) tend to believe that a more general
phenomenon is now occurring, namely \an organisational and dimensional
consolidation of existing production units. In particular, this change con-
sists of a rise in the relative weight of middle sized units, the development of
`quasi-hierarchic' governance patterns such as company groups, a decline in
the demographic growth that for a long time characterised the emergence of
the small business sector, and a stop to the deverticalisation of production
at least in some dimensional classes of ¯rms" (Arrighetti, Traµ u 2006: 44-5).
Owing to the lack of appropriate data, all conclusions remain tentative
but these elements do suggest that the organisational convergence between
small and large ¯rms that Regini and Sabel (1989) refer to may be leading
to something quite di®erent from the IDs depicted in the ¯rst sections of
this paper. Although districts never consisted of homogeneous ¯rms, an
only because there is no alternative.
20\First, the recession of the second half of the 1980s hampered the maintenance of
the equilibrium between competition and cooperation in local markets, so threatening the
regular functioning of the district as an organisational model. A second, more structural,
reason relates to the increased need for coordination [associated to] product diversi¯cation
and quality upgrading" (Dei Ottati 1996a: 47). A third reason Dei Ottati mentions is the
riskiness of investment \particularly for specialized subcontractors who have little contact
with increasingly variable ¯nal markets" (ibid.).
12accentuated di®erentiation tends to be a distinctive feature in their evolution.
Ferrucci and Varaldo (1993) argue that only some ¯rms { i.e. lead ¯rms - are
able to enhance the required organisational change within districts, which
suggests that a shift is occurring from the \invisible mind" of the district to
\more visible minds" (Lombardi 2003a).
Let us return to the data presented above. Despite the di®erences between
H and M, the overall decline in the turnover of district-based ¯rms, coupled
with the drop in employment, suggests that businesses are having a hard
time. The decline implies that it is unlikely that unsuccessful ¯rms can
nonetheless survive through subcontracting. The data concerning irregular
employment and accidents does not tell us whether these phenomena date
back to the Seventies { the Golden Age of IDs { or emerged in more recent
times, as a response to economic changes. Thus, it is not clear how important
precariousness was to the economic vitality of IDs in the Seventies, relative
to the dynamics of demand and other exogenous circumstances. The data
shows, however, that ¯rms are now pursuing competitiveness any way they
can and that one of these ways is cost scrapping through employment and
income precariousness, as well as through precarious working conditions.
By shifting their costs on their workers, ¯rms socialise costs. They ulti-
mately call upon the family to substitute the district in its role as a social
bu®er. This redistribution between ¯rms and society is coupled with redis-
tribution within the value chain. The control of the ¯nal market that Carone
and Iacobucci refer to is not only an (e±cient) way to manage a turbulent
market: it is the means whereby lead ¯rms may control the distribution of
value added within the group and/or the network of ¯rms they interact with
(Ramazzotti 2004).
The implication is that districts may well attract migration °ows but,
contrary to what Becattini and Dei Ottati argue, this is no evidence of social
cohesion. It only suggests that districts provide some opportunity for a living
whereas other areas do not: rather than social cohesion, this is more likely
to be resignment.
The data suggests that rather than taking advantage of the distinctive
feature of districts - i.e. the positive interaction between the technical fea-
tures of a °exible organisation of production and social cohesion - district
¯rms are disrupting it by trying to achieve a competitiveness that under-
mines the quality of life of IDs, and social cohesion along with it. Truly,
M districts perform better. They do not appear to make up for the decline
in the H districts, however, so that the overall picture is all but reassuring.
Ultimately, the relatively good performance of IDs may quite trivially re°ect
13the mismanagement of large ¯rms and of industrial policy21.
5 What's wrong?
Three major circumstances a®ected the competitive environment of the Ital-
ian economy and of its IDs over time, leading to a marked change from
the mid-Eighties onwards: increasing competition from less industrialised
economies; technological change, especially associated to information and
communication technologies; restrictive macroeconomic policies, thus a lower
growth in e®ective demand. Roughly, three main strategies were available:
restructuring, i.e. a quantitative change in capacity and costs; repositioning,
i.e. a qualitative change in output; reconversion, i.e. the switch to di®erent
industries22. They were di±cult to enact, however. Leaving aside the last
one, which is the alternative fostered by the authors discussed in Section 2,
the ¯rst two roughly correspond to what Sengenberger and Pyke (1992) refer
to as the \low road" and the \high road". \[T]he `low road' to restructur-
ing [...] consists of seeking competitiveness through low labour cost, and
a deregulated labour market environment. [...] The principal alternative to
such `destructive' competition is the `high road' of constructive competition,
based on e±ciency enhancement and innovation; that is, through economic
gains that make wage gains and improvements in social conditions feasible,
as well as safeguarding workers' rights and providing adequate standards of
social protection." (Sengenberger and Pyke 1992: 12-13).
The outlook of the previous section is that a great many IDs are follow-
ing the `low road'. To some extent this should not come as a surprise. The
potential unsustainability of the district model when demand is not high
was pointed out by Brusco (1982), who foresaw that a problem of social
costs would arise23. Brusco (1990) also stressed the di±culties associated
to technological change when coordination is decentralised and learning is
21As Signorini and Omiccioli (2005: 20) argue, \the evidence does not suggest that
industrial districts are leading Italy's industrial decline. Whatever its causes, it is more
visible outside of industrial agglomerations than within them; thus, it is associated less to
the speci¯c weakness of the districts than to the general weaknesses of the Italian system,
along with the even more marked weaknesses of alternative productive organisations.".
22Obviously, these strategies could be combined to some extent.
23\There is only one way to avoid the dilemma of ensuring primary conditions of em-
ployment in all Emilian ¯rms and yet preserving the °exibility of the system as a whole
in a situation where demand is uncertain. To achieve such a result it would be necessary
to construct a new secondary sector of ¯rms and workers outside the region. (...) The
internal contradictions of Emilia gradually become in this way external ones, which other
regions have to face and resolve." (Brusco 1982: 177).
14a widespread process24. These di±culties are aggravated by public policy,
when it enhances cost-centred restructuring - rather than innovation-centred
policies { or when, alternatively, it determines competitive devaluations. The
absence of a consistent set of incentives increases uncertainty, to the detri-
ment of long term investment. Thus, it is no wonder that short-termism has
prevailed25.
The \low road" basically violates the conditions for social cohesion in that
it undermines both trust and con¯dence. It precludes an innovative process
based on participation as well as the district's function as an entrepreneurial
incubator. It therefore leads the district away from the canonical model,
possibly towards something similar to Porter's (1998) notion of an industrial
cluster. Under these circumstances most of the arguments against the \two
persistent peculiarities" of IDs may actually appear to be relevant.
In order to properly assess the above process, let us try to understand
what is going on from a broader theoretical perspective. One possible ex-
planation is that the institutional characteristics of IDs prevent them from
adapting to changing markets. Basically, the argument goes as follows. Dis-
tricts consist of institutions that, together with the market, co-ordinate eco-
nomic activity. Institutions, however, tend to be resilient. They take time
to change, more that the market allows for26. The outcome is that ¯rms fail
to innovate and to achieve the required competitiveness.
Viewed from this perspective, lead ¯rms appear as the Schumpeterian
innovators who break up consolidated views and institutional rigidity, thereby
providing breakthroughs in business. The social costs pointed out above
turn out to be the inevitable consequence of change, possibly requiring some
compensation by local or national authorities.
In this perspective, the shift of the unit of analysis from the district as a
whole to the district ¯rm (Ferrucci, Varaldo 1993; Brioschi, Brioschi, Cainelli
24\The fact that the district has neither a head nor a hierarchical structure, makes a
move towards new technology much more di±cult. The district is characterised by a sort of
strong, heavy inertia. It goes on learning the technology in a deep, personal and creative
way, but it is very di±cult to move this huge mass of people - not just the dependent
workers, but the whole competence of all the people." (Brusco 1990: 17).
25Garofoli (1999) points out, for instance, that following the devaluation of the Lira in
1992, ¯rms did not reinvest their pro¯t in innovative investment but transformed it into
rents by progressively giving up production to smaller ¯rms, who tended to turn from \dis-
trict ¯rms" into \outsourcing ¯rms". \Under the previously described circumstances the
goal was not innovation or development but only short term viability and the preservation
of cost competitivitiveness and of the lead ¯rm's extra-pro¯t." (Garofoli 1999: 397).
26The \rules of interaction are stable and inertial elements [...] and tend to persist
even during phases of radical change of the external environment, to the point that they
turn into factors that block the system's innovation." (Varaldo et al., 1998: 30-31).
152002; Biggiero, Samarra 2003) apparently re°ects not only the empirical ev-
idence about the increasing importance of lead ¯rms but also the internal
inconsistency of the district as a system and the emerging role of a new coor-
dinating instance arising from one of the latter's sub-systems. Although the
authors who follow this approach do not deny that the district is important,
its importance is reduced to that of a context, an environment where exter-
nalities enhance the market-related activities of ¯rms. Social cohesion makes
(economic) sense, in this perspective, in so far as it re°ects the consistency
between market forces and the institutional setup.
Leaving aside the fact that, based on this approach, nothing warrants
a satisfactory solution to the competitive and growth requirements of the
districts - in that, in the absence of the institutional setup of a district, sin-
gle ¯rms are likely to pursue the redistribution of existing value added, at
the expense of their workers and of other ¯rms, rather than try to increase
it through quality enhancing innovation - the novelty that the approach fo-
cuses on is that lead ¯rms can a®ord the economies of scale in areas such
as marketing, ¯nance and R&D. We are not that far from the \dwarfness"
thesis outlined in Section 2.
What is important about this approach, however, is that, implicitly draw-
ing on North (1990), institutions are assessed in terms of their e±ciency, i.e.
their e®ect on growth. This is a reasonable criterion but when it entails that
growth { or some other market-related metric { is the only objective func-
tion that institutions comply with, it denies the overall theoretical relevance
of districts and of the district-based approach depicted in Sections 2 and 3.
The distinctive feature of the latter is precisely that the institutional setup
must ensure not only the material reproduction of a community but the re-
production of a \socio-territorial entity which is characterised by the active
presence of both a community of people and a population of ¯rms". Growth
may surely be a goal to be pursued but it must not clash with other goals that
emerge within that community. In so far as the above explanatory approach
does not deal with this requirement, it must be considered unsatisfactory.
These considerations lead us to an alternative explanation. The repro-
duction of the district as a socio-territorial entity is possible so long as there
is social cohesion, in the sense that the institutional setups associated to the
population of ¯rms and to the community of people are mutually consistent.
The ¯rst setup includes what is functional to market performance, thus to
competitiveness-enhancing and pro¯tability-enhancing interaction. The sec-
ond setup involves what a®ects the quality of peoples' lives: income and
occupational stability; safe working conditions; social mobility; etc..
Although social cohesion tends to be self-reinforcing, the two sub-systems
maintain di®erent rationales. Whenever internal or external circumstances
16change, these rationales may { at least to some extent { become inconsis-
tent27. In some instances this may disrupt the district system. This is pre-
cisely what occurs with the \low road". It puts internal rivalry (within the
¯rm and within the value chain) before external rivalry (between the dis-
trict and other areas). It subordinates the values and institutions concerning
the quality of life to the institutions a®ecting the market. In so doing, it
generates an inconsistency between these two sets of institutions, thereby
undermining the conditions for district vitality.
Contrary to the previous explanation, there is no reason to assume that
the only way out of this inconsistency is to forsake those institutions that
preclude a prompt adaptation to market requirements, especially because,
as the data shows, there is no reason to believe that compliance with those
requirements achieves employment and growth. The \low road" strategy is
the consequence of an incentive structure that disregards innovation, that
favours short-termism, that does not preclude cost shifting and the conse-
quent insurgence of social costs, and that does not consider social cohesion as
a priority. It is the outcome of only one out of many possible incentive struc-
tures. The alternative strategy we have been discussing - the \high road"
{ would reinforce the virtuous cumulative e®ects of the canonical model. It
would require an appropriate public action, however. In the case under dis-
cussion public action would involve, among other things, the introduction
and enforcement of laws in favour of safe working conditions and against
irregular labour, and incentives that make precarious jobs ever more costly.
The key issue is not the speci¯c type of intervention but the need for
public action that is not merely supplementary to the decisions of the major
actors involved in a district. Doubtless, measures that provide \real services"
(Brusco 1992) or \collective goods" (Crouch et al., 2001), and the \provision
of forums for regular exchange and debate among representatives of the vari-
ous interest groups (...) in order to develop a shared understanding of local
problems and to come to commonly-agreed programmes of action." (Dei Ot-
tati, 1996b: 62) are important. These policies allow actors to properly choose
and carry out their strategies. They a®ect the incentive structure only up to
a point, however.
In order to prevent strategies that are convenient in the short-run { and
only to some actors - but not in the long-run { and not to the district as
a whole - policy makers must not simply enable actors to choose their best
strategies within a given scenario: they must create the appropriate sce-
27Franchi and Rieser (1991), drawing on the evidence from the province of Modena,
argue that this inconsistency tends to occur - independently of external circumstances
such as those outlined above - as a consequence of economic behaviour in modern societies,
which is based on what Weber referred to as formal rationality.
17nario. In this perspective measures against economic and health precar-
iousness would change the incentive structure in favour of a \high road"
scenario, thereby changing expectations, strategies and the very frameworks
for \commonly-agreed programmes of action".
Contrary to views whereby self-organising districts provide an alterna-
tive to active welfare state intervention, part of this regulatory action would
consist of measures that prevent the shifting of private costs on the com-
munity in general and especially on social groups who have no bargaining
power whatsoever and would therefore have no voice in the above mentioned
forums.
What this view ultimately suggests is that districts are a special type of
organisation. Like all organisations, there is no self-equilibrating mechanism
that ensures the solution to con°icts. As March and Simon (1958) taught
us half a century ago, such solutions may require not only persuasion and
bargaining but also politics, i.e. the establishment and management of ap-
propriate power relations. When the balance between the two subsystems of
a district is dubious, explicit public action may be better than \spontaneous"
adjustments.
6 Conclusions
The available data suggests that social cohesion in IDs { a crucial requirement
for the vitality of these socio-economic setups { is declining as a result of
circumstances that include changes in aggregate demand, in technology and
in international trade. Thus, the relatively positive economic performance
of IDs seems to occur at the expense of their long term social and economic
viability as IDs. This need not mean that they are going to disappear: they
are changing into something else - possibly industrial clusters { with less
stringent requirements in terms of social cohesion. The literature cited in
Section 2 suggests that IDs should become similar to big business. The
above discussion of ID performance suggests that this is what is probably
going on, and that the consequences are not wholly satisfactory.
IDs in the light manufacturing industries tend to perform better, both in
economic and social terms, than IDs that produce goods for individuals and
households. This di®erence remains to be explained. It does suggest that
di®erences in technology { in a broad sense - may have prevailed over com-
mon district-speci¯c characteristics. While this may be true, the question
remains whether this was inevitable or it depended on how district actors
reacted to the above circumstances. Further investigations may clarify these
issues but the overall picture is one where social costs are high to the point
18that the fairly good performance of IDs seems to depend less on their spe-
ci¯c characteristics than on the bad performance of large industry and big
business in general. As for the latter, in the absence of a fully satisfactory
account of their dismal performance, it might be worth while to investigate
whether it might depend on circumstances that are similar to those depicted
for IDs, namely that the \low road" dominates its manufacturing strategies,
making it ever less competitive and ever more prone to ¯nancial rather than
manufacturing activities.
The changes in IDs raise a few issues. First, how can we judge them? It
is doubtful that the substitution of lead ¯rms for the social and economic
interaction that characterised IDs is going to prevent social costs such as un-
employment, precarious working conditions and overall quality of life. Since
there is a subjective component in the perception of the quality of life, it may
well be true that people eventually adapt to unpleasant circumstances, at the
very least because they wish to avoid the cognitive dissonance between their
desires and the status quo. Such a situation is questionable, however, from a
more general { i.e. community - perspective. If a community's goal includes
the well being also of people who are unable to foresee a better quality of life,
then ancillary adaptation to the status quo may not be the best strategy.
Second, what can be done? If we accept the above remarks, whereby
strictly economic goals should not prevail over the general goal of well being,
a possible strategy may consist in pursuing policies that enhance social co-
hesion. Public policy is required because the choice context that private ID
actors are faced with does not allow them to choose how to overcome this
situation: when pro¯t priorities prevail over social needs, ¯rms substitute the
{ fairly demanding { social coordination of economic activity within the ID
with the de¯nitely less demanding coordination carried out by relative prices
and the pro¯t motive. Social needs become constraints rather than goals and
the ensuing action and institutions tend to enter a path dependent process
that leads IDs astray.
In this perspective, any action that, following the canonical theory of
IDs, aims to increase the competitiveness of IDs and their contribution to
economic growth must re-establish a balance between the requirements of
the two subsystems that comprise them, i.e. the social requirements of the
community of people and the market-related requirements of the population
of ¯rms. The two strategies depicted as the \high road" and the \low road"
are important, from this point of view, because the former is consistent with
such a goal while the \low road" does not safeguard social cohesion, thereby
undermining the conditions for the social reproduction of the ID and, as a
consequence, the very institutions that ¯rms need to pro¯tably carry out
their economic activity.
19Public policy cannot play a merely ancillary role, favouring appropriate
choices within that path. It must change the incentive structure and the
institutional and choice contexts so as to change that very path. Another
way to look at the same issue is that policy makers must try to re-establish
the synergy between the subsystems of IDs. When that synergy fails to
occur, the alternative does not consist in some trade o® between pro¯t and
social requirements: it is either a new synergy { such as some of the authors
mentioned in Section 5 foresee - or overall decline, something that the strictly
economic decline discussed in Section 2 is just a part of.
This leads us to a third issue. As Section 2 argues, major contribu-
tions concerning Italy's industrial structure and possible economic decline
are generally based on the assumption that the social division of labour is
determined by strictly technological peculiarities and relative prices. In this
perspective, institutions tend to be assessed exclusively in terms of whether
they are functional, and consequently are able to adapt, to the resulting mar-
ket conditions. The approach followed here suggests that if the institutions
that relate to the population of ¯rms subsume the institutions that relate to
the community of people, one or both of these subsystems may be negatively
a®ected. In some instances it is a matter of value judgement whether this is
desirable. In general, however, the long run viability of the economy and/or
of society may be undermined, an issue that is somewhat neglected in the
literature on Italy's economic decline.
It is therefore reasonable to believe that - quite independently of the
relevance of economies of scale and hierarchies, as opposed to interaction
and complementarities { this insight, which dates back to authors such as K.
Polanyi and K.W. Kapp but is consistent with the canonical theory of IDs,
should not be dismissed when discussing Italy's economic performance.
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